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The Great War
Seen Through the
Comparative Lens
Steven L. McClellan
The Pennsylvania State University
Why Comparative History? A Unity of Difference
So much has been published on the First World War that it
might be more worthwhile to ask, why the Great War again? A
new call for a reevaluation the war seems to be most trifling, and
probably met with an occasional yawn: surely someone has
developed an adequate interpretation by now. However, recent
efforts by numerous historians in Europe, such as Jay M. Winter,
Annette Becker, and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, have shown that
this assertion would be quite wrong. Since the end of the war in
1918, there have been numerous historical paradigms, each
focusing on different “configurations” that were believed to be
important in remembering the war. The aim here is to argue that to
fully understand the First World War we must examine the
collective response of the national communities that fought it.
Naturally, as the war dragged on, and as the cost in life and
material rose, the representations of the national communities
changed to adapt to the situation of the times. It can even be said
that this is the beginning of the change of the nationalist narrative
from the cultural to the political: after all, words such as “threat”,
“security”, and “sacred” all belong to the conservative political
camp. The origins of totalitarianism, whether fascist, Nazi, or
communist, can be directly traced back to the Great War and the

development of the integrated national community. There is
something to be said of Martin Heidegger’s concern about the
totalizing and enframing processes that occur in the twentieth
century, although he would find different sources for this.
Whatever the origin, the fact is that since the beginning of the
Modern Age, the issues of identity, both for the individual, and for
his connection to society, has been of primary concern. It is
therefore essential to examine the cultural modes of representation
used by the peoples of the past which they used to aid in making
sense of their own world, and not to merely trace the notions of
“progression”, whether if it is a supposed progression of
technology, political systems, economics, or liberty. Henri Bergson
was correct that time is duration. However, in order to come to
express the actions, feelings, ideas, and emotions of our
predecessors, we must examine it one expression at a time, and
hopefully, just hopefully, a larger picture will become clear.
In a sense, this paper is an exercise in cultural history, in
which it examines what Jay Winter calls “representations.” To
Winter this is merely a part of the shifting paradigm in First World
War studies, corresponding to the third historiographical
configuration: cultural history.1 To Winter, “cultural history is a
history of the intimate…It is a history of signifying practices; it
studies how men and women make sense of the world in which
they live.”2 These signifiers can be found in the many ways that
collective national communities represented their world through
art, literature, media, music, toys, games, monuments, etc. What
makes the First World War so important in the terms of the
national community is how the populations that made up these
communities responded to the war and the sacrifices made during
it: “Social identities are legitimized through commemoration. Here
is one of the major characteristics of contemporary cultural life:
identity is value.”3 However, the historian must be cautious so as
not to overstep these cultural signifiers, for the war itself may be
given too much precedence and itself reified. In his own
1
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argument, Winter maintains that the shift to cultural history was
made in response to the fall of the Marxist paradigm, where
histories today do not make sense because of their objectivity, “but
precisely [because of] their subjectivity, and the question of how
representative are they is now deemed meaningless.”4 The search
is not for all-encompassing histories that provide universal
explanations; rather it is for a history of everyday life, what the
Germans call the Alltagsgeschichte. The study of the
representations that national communities used to define their
world during specific points in history is called “mentalités.” It is
what Winter has called “the mental furniture of populations” in the
past: “Mentalité in this discourse means visceral commitments
rather than ideologies, unspoken assumptions rather than political
or social programs.”5 With the decline of historical materialism,
the turn is made towards the ideas and representations that make
up the human condition. For all intents and purposes, this is the
era of a new historical idealism.
This shift to cultural history has been closely aligned with
the First World War, and with warfare in general. Stéphane
Audoin-Rouzeau coined the term “war culture” (culture de guerre)
alluding to the conceptual mental framework men and women
draw on to make sense of their world at war. In a series of studies
on childhood, war atrocities, and mourning practices, AudoinRouzeau showed the way this war culture seeped into every area of
domestic life.6 He goes so far to argue that war strips man down to
his barest essentials, allowing the historian to see visibly his ideas
and beliefs:
The violence specific to warfare is a prism that
refracts many otherwise invisible aspects of the
world. Entire societies can be seen anew, but one
must be willing to look closely. In paroxysms of
4
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violence everything is stripped naked - starting with men,
their bodies, their fantasies and desires, their fears,
passions, beliefs hatreds…the motivations that
allow them to kill their fellow men and endure the
terror of confrontation - these pertain to something
essential - something we shall call their
‘representations’.7
Audoin-Rouzeau falls in line with the work of British military
historian John Keegan, in challenging the Clausewitzian notion
that “war is politics by other means”, both stating a deep truth: war
is first and foremost a cultural act.8 However, the inseparable
character of the nation and the people brings merit to this argument
that war is the creation and unification of culture by other means
against external “enemies.” After all, had Clausewitz not also said
“The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent
existence in the peoples”?9
The Discourses of the National Community
In an essay entitled, “Of Men and Myths: The Use and
Abuse of History and the Great War,” Holger H. Herwig examines
five case studies in which myths about historical events were
created, and elaborated upon.10 Herwig uses the term myth, not “in
Joseph Campbell’s sense, whereby myths are designed to teach us
how to search for meaning, to seek the essence of being alive, and
to feel the spiritual potentialities of life,” but in the “classic Greek
sense, in which the myth, for all its inconsistencies and absurdities,
when accepted as truth, represents the learning and wisdom of a
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society.”11 Myths are an essential part of modern political
culture. They constitute that web of shared meaning by which the
members of a complex society form and sustain their association,
providing the unity as something natural, self-evident.12 The
narration of these myths becomes important, for the names that are
given to the objects in the narration, as well as those who are either
telling the story or those who the story is being told to, creates
identities, and the narrative myth becomes a part of identity.
Names therefore are important in the telling of a story, in that, as
Jean-François Lyotard has pointed out: “Names - define a world, a
world of names - the cultural world. This world is finite because in
it the number of available names is finite.”13 These stories of
narration fill the gaps between these names, and in the case of a
myth, according to Herwig’s usage, they are placed in the
particular gaps of a story that are unique to the experience of a
society.
To expand on Herwig’s example, the historian at times
provides a helping hand in creating and developing narratives that
can be taken as either/or truth and identity creation. This is
particularly so when the historian belongs to a specific community
that has for a long time accepted a myth as an integral part of
national identity. Indeed, after Hayden White and the linguistic
turn, and after Alain Corbin and Roger Chartier and the history of
representations, it is impossible to even take eye-witness accounts
at their face value without raising questions as to how they were
formulated, constructed, and prefigured by their author’s views.
Ernest Gellner states that “Nationalism is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not
exist.”14 However, there must be a distinction made: Gellner
supposes that all nationalism masquerades as a falsity, and does
not consider its creation. Benedict Anderson places his emphasis
on the “imagining” of the national community, in which it is
11
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imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion.”15 More importantly in terms of the narration, as
Anderson points out, is that “communities are to be
distinguished…by the style in which they are imagined.”16 This
places the emphasis of study on the narrative itself, as it is the
acceptance of the narrative as truth that becomes part of the
creation of identity.
It is again Jay Winter who points out two kinds of narrative
discourses that were in use in Europe during, and before the First
World War. The historical tradition, influenced by Paul Fussell’s
The Great War and Modern Memory, which focused primarily on
the British war poets, argued that the war had swept away a set of
literary conventions and gave us a new and deeply ironic voice.
This was a point in human history where mankind attacked the
abstract notions that had been followed blindly: it was the break of
tradition, and the creation of the Modern. As Fussell writes: “the
Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place
within a seamless, purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream
of time running from past through present to future…the Great
War took place in what was, compared with ours, a static world,
where the values appeared stable and where the meanings of
abstractions seemed permanent and reliable.”17 The argument that
the Great War represented a break in history, and discontinuity
with the past and with the Modern has been well commented on.
Kenneth Silver’s Esprit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avantgarde and the First World War writes that after 1914, “selfcontrol, self-abnegation, and self-denial of so many kinds became
a national modus vivendi” and that this mood dominated the visual
arts as it did the rest of social life. It was only after the war had
ended that artists could again begin to “invent the world” without
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the shackles of war-related constraints.18 Thus, the war was for
Silver, a step backwards: modernity was regressive not
progressive. Modris Eksteins presents us with another view of
Modernism in his Rites of Spring: the Great War and the Birth of
the Modern Age. Speaking from a distinctly German perspective
(although Eksteins deals with Britain and France, the main drive of
the argument is clear), the author echoes the birth of Modernity as
a creation born of chaos, quoting Elias Canetti: “the banging of
windows, and the crashing of glass are the robust sounds of fresh
life, the cries of something new-born.”19 Eksteins’ argument
follows that the questioning of traditional values, indeed the
Nietzschean “transvaluation of values” of violence, power,
aggression, that denote Nazi culture can be traced back to the war
enthusiasm felt by Germans in August 1914. This is the reason
why Eksteins sees profound links between facets of Stravinsky’s
“Rite of Spring,” the theatricality of the Great War, and the
primitive choreography of Nazi “culture.”
In response, Jay Winter argues in Sites of Memory, Sites of
Mourning—based on the “collective remembrance” of the Great
War—Modernity was not solely the only form used to make sense
of the time. For Winter, “Modernism was a cultural phenomenon,”
for sure, but at the same time “a set of what may be called
‘traditional values’—classical, romantic, or religious images and
ideas widely disseminated in both elite and popular culture before
and during the war,” remained.20 For Winter, the war did not
represent a clear break from the Modern and the traditional, as both
“forms of imagining the war were evident long before the
armistice. Furthermore, the distinction was at times more
rhetorical than real. Modernists didn’t obliterate traditions; they
stretched, explored, and reconfigured them in ways that alarmed
conventional artists, writers, and the public at large.”21 Winter
notes quite correctly that Modernism follows its own teleology,
18
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that is always dependent on the past:
‘Modernism’ - more of a temperament than a set of
fixed beliefs - left behind as neatly and surgically as
some scholars suggest a host of images and
conventions derived from eighteenth and
nineteenth-century religious, romantic, or classical
traditions…it is the very teleology of this position the search for precursors or exponents of what later
critics have admired or rejected - which makes the
‘modernist’ hypothesis about the cultural history of
the early twentieth century just as misleading as
other tendentious interpretations of recent or not so
recent history.22
It is interesting here to compare Winter’s work with Anderson’s
conception of the temporal trappings of nationalism. For
Anderson, the narrative of nationalism follows a conception of
simultaneity, in which time, is “an idea of homogeneous, emptytime, in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time,
marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal
coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.”23 The age of
nationalism is represented by the connection of past and future,
which is what gives a national community its distinct identity, and
culture. This is not merely a “Modern” mode of interpretation and
criticism, but one that was in play ever since historical
consciousness was awaken in Europe at least by the fifteenthcentury; after all the dialectic of ancients and moderns in history
dated as far back as Machiavelli.24
The Great War was a culmination of the traditional modes
of cultural representations coupled with the discourses of the
Modern being played out on the battlefield. Although there had
been wars between nation-states in Europe before, the First World
War marked the first conflict that encompassed the whole of every
national community involved. Even the neutral nations, as far
22
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away as the United States, would not be left untouched. There is
no discontinuity in the twentieth century between the traditional
and the Modern, surely the romantic images of war were lost by
1918, especially once the war poets and novelists got their hands
on them, but the men and women of the generation of 1914, the
masses that made up the armies and workers, went to war that year
based on the ideas and representations that composed their national
identities - the war for all belligerent nations was justified by
defense of the common, collective identity. However the Great
War was such a traumatic event, it left many aloft and devoid of
meaning. The huge excesses in killing and destruction, even after
the war, made people feel at the time that the war did offer a break
with the past. After all, how could Europe go back to the way
things were after such a catastrophe? And although has Jay Winter
as pointed out, “Auschwitz was not Verdun”, it still must be
remembered that the “lost generation” of 1914 were executioners
as well as victims.25
The Nation at War: Singularity and Universality
Most historians would maintain that the nationalist
narrative began in France. The Great Revolution had created both
internal and external concerns, which made it necessary for the
numerous revolutionary governments to promote the idea of not
only the nation, but also of the “Republic” in order to maintain
what had been gained. There were of course movements against
this: one can only think of the slaughter of the Vendée, and the
alienation of the clergy. However, for the most part, the nationalist
zeal that overtook France and Europe was quite successful. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared: “The
principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No
body, no individual can exercise authority that does not expressly
emanate from it” (article 3). The nation was to be the collective
representation of “the general will” that Rousseau had argued
should be the basis of political government. As for Rousseau:
“What causes human misery is the contradiction…between nature
and social institutions, between man and citizen…Give him over
25
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entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself, but if you
divide his heart you destroy him.”26 In this sense, as a Republic,
France had chosen to be a nation of citizens, one of civilization,
not of barbarism.
The problems that this causes, argues Tzvetan Todorov is
that “Legitimation via the nation instead of God has been viewed
as inseparable from preference for one’s own country at the
expense of universal principles, membership in a culture - which is
undeniable and unavoidable - has come to justify the requirement
that cultural and political entities should coincide.”27 However,
Todorov has pointed out: “the ‘internal’ nation proceeds from the
idea of equality, while the ‘external’ nation implies on the contrary
a preferential choice in favor of one’s own country over all the
others, thus implying inequality.”28 This is the narrative of national
community that had formed in the “external” idea of France, the
geographical construction, which was legitimized by the
“internal,” cultural France. Once this distinction between the
French national community from its neighbors, once the cultural
and political had been overlapped, the idea that “The French have
become the foremost people of the universe”, proclaiming one
deputy in the National Assembly, was created. This notion of
liberating the beleaguered peoples of Europe from the tyranny of
monarchical government and despotism grew into the idea of
“mission civilatrice.” This was based on the moral notion that once
free, and once they had obtained the rights of man and citizen, it
was now the duty of the French people to be the beacon of reason
to the rest of the world, still under the grip of tyrannous kings.
Durand-Maillane wrote in 1791 that the new constitution “has to
make the people of France happy, and by imitation, all people.”29
However, as Eugen Weber points out, it was the rural areas of
France, and those regions and populations that were hardly
“French” in the sense of Parisian “civilization,” that were made the
26
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object of this “civilizing mission.” Weber makes the point that
“the people of whole regions [of France] felt little identity with the
state or with people of other regions” even by 1870.30 It seems that
France during and after the Revolution, made a greater effort
attempting to acclimate the French people to the “civilizing
process” than external peoples. A student in Paris, Georges
Valérie, wrote in 1901 that “Conquest is a necessary stage on the
road to nationalism…[A nation should] bring in larger unity
groups without a clear cultural identity, to draw in, to enrich, to
enlighten the uninstructed tribal mind, this is the civilizing mission
we cannot renounce.”31 It was necessary to assimilate rural
populations for the simple fact that they were generally conceived
to have no culture of their own; they were still reliant on antiquated
ways. These communities could therefore only benefit from their
integration into the larger French community. Weber suggests it
may be easier to see the integration of peoples into national
communities in the light of colonialism. Throughout Western
Europe this process was hugely successful, mostly because of the
growth of nationalist education, mainly through the teaching of
history.
Schools taught potent lessons of morality focused on duty,
effort, and seriousness of purpose. This had been the goal of
François Guizot as early as 1833, when he defined the instruction
that schools were intended to provide: reading, writing, and
arithmetic to furnish essential skills, the teaching of French and of
the metric system to implant or increase the sense of unity under
French nationhood, moral and religious instruction to serve
spiritual and social needs.32 The history of France before the Great
War was presented in a continuous chain, extending back to
Roman times, one text declaring “Here we are, more than two
thousand years ago, in the period when France was still called
Gaul.”33 France here appears less a nation and more an essence
projected backwards, invoking the idea of la France éternelle.
30
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French soldiers and statesmen became heroes; French culture and
style was made primary, the very expression of high art; class
conflict was completely excluded. In all this, France became a
nation, indeed a spirit that was eternal and undying. Increasingly,
French nationalism re-emphasized the differences between
France’s “mission civilatrice” and Germany’s Kultur and
Weltpolitik; two distinct teleological narratives, each giving divine
meaning to the community on opposite sides of the Rhine. These
kinds of narratives are what Etienne Balibar call “the two
symmetrical figures of the illusion of national identity”: where
history articulates both a national personality and a national
mission.34 The comparison with Germany fundamentally shaped
the French national community before the war, and these
assumptions had a profound effect on how it responded in the early
days as the Germans invaded France herself.
Germany for its part saw not only an external difference
with France, but also to the east of her borders, to the lands of
Russia. The Prussian victory in 1870 had led most in the German
military and government to dismiss the French threat to the West,
fearing only the possibility of a two-front war. Russia’s huge army
and vastness of territory provided the Germans with an immediate
concern and also the opportunity to realize its own historical
mission. For many Germans, Russia provided the opportunities of
dynastic expansion, but also an exoteric calling of spirituality.
Sturm und Drang movement members Klinger and Lenz discerned
in Russia and its people a spiritual breadth, and even Rilke
considered Russia his spiritual homeland. Artists, musicians, and
philosophers from Wagner to Nietzsche, from Spengler to Thomas
Mann reveled in the exotic imagination of the East.35 However,
this feeling also was coupled with the imperialistic designs of
many Germans, concluding that the Eastern peoples provided a
tabula rosa, where the people were still young, and nobly savage,
for which provided the opportunity for German Kultur to cultivate.
34
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It became a fixation of the German imagination to “Drive to the
East” (the Drang nach Osten) which had developed by at least the
1860s. This became a commonly held assumption of Germany’s
ultimate destiny in the ascension of Weltpolitik.
If history provided access to the new temporal conceptions
of nationalism, then geography and its teaching offered the same
for the spatial. With the learning of sciences and of cosmography,
the intake of general terms of geographical landscapes that are
codified in a descriptive language, presenting pupils with a
universal reference system, complete with uniform rules.36
Geography provides names and legitimizes space, it was necessary
for the nation to move towards the resacralization of one part of
space – the national territory in the teaching of geography.
Germany told its students of the “special relationship to the
landscape” and incarnated a collective myth to conquer Russian
lands.37 In France, the concept of the “Hexagon” was created. For
school students the geometric figure of the hexagon allowed them
to conceptualize the image of France as they learned the geography
of their country. They were also taught the départements as well;
learning to recite the departments’ names as well as their
prefectures and sub-prefectures. Of course, regional boundaries did
not always follow natural boundaries created by climate, weather,
rivers, and mountains. The Republic made great efforts in trying to
integrate these natural geographic realities with the abstract
boundaries of administrative units. School geography was
successful in implanting national identity and making this national
identity the property of every Frenchmen.38
The outbreak of war in 1914 brought all these totalizing
principles to the forefront of daily life. Years of nationalist
sentiment and collective identity now spread over in all spheres of
cultural life. Furthermore, this was not merely a development left
to one nation, but was a phenomenon experienced by every nation
that entered the war, including America, usually presented by
historians as wanting to avoid the war. Ideological battles between
36
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the academia of the belligerents were fought just as viciously as
the war on the battlefield. In October 1914, virtually the entire
German academic profession - over 4,000 names, including almost
every professor at almost every German university - endorsed a
declaration entitled “An der Kulturwelt” (To the World of Culture).
Numbered among them were closet socialists, future pacifists, and
skeptics, including Max Weber and Alfred Einstein.39 Their list of
denials concluded with two assertions: first, that the future of
European culture rested on the victory of German so-called
“militarism”; and secondly, that in defining this militarism there
was no distinction to be made between Prussia and the rest of
Germany, or between the German army and the German nation:
“both are one.”40 “Our belief,” the declaration continues “is that
the salvation of all European culture depends on the victory for
which German ‘militarism’ is fighting, the discipline, the loyalty,
the spirit of sacrifice of the united free German people.”41 German
Kultur, which embraced concepts that began with the community
but were defined nationally, the idea of Geist, was taken in contrast
to “civilization.” Rudolf Eucken, the German philosopher and
Nobel Prize winner published on “the world historical significance
of the German spirit,” asserting that Germany could not be
defeated while it remained truly united and stood fast in its inner
strength.42 Hew Strachan argues that the war of 1914 had led the
Germans away from previous advances in culture, and placed them
on a new path:
The clash between civilization and Kultur took
German thought back to its late-eighteenth-century
roots. In condemning civilization, the philosophers
of 1914 were reflecting the rationality of the
Enlightenment and the consequences of the French
Revolution. They argued that, following what was
39
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essentially an alien, French track, philosophy had
elevated the rule of law and the rights of the
individual, and so had promoted selfishness and
materialism. At one level, therefore the summons of
1914 was a call to rediscover the ideas of the
Aufklärung and to refurbish the memory of 1813.43
It was yet another clash between the discourses of the traditional
and the Modern.
This declaration by the German academic profession only
legitimated the claims of their French counterparts. The French
responded with their declaration on November 3. It contained the
names of 100 members of the French literary and artistic world,
including Gerorges Clemenceau, Barrès, Debussy, Gide, Matisse,
and Monet. Declaring that “the intellectual and moral richness of
humanity is created by the natural variety and independence of all
nations’ gifts,” it was clear that it was a statement of the kind of
universalizing principle that the Republic had always claimed as
the self-anointed beacon of civilization.44 On December 12,
Bergson told the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques that
German philosophy was “a translation into intellectual terms of her
brutality, her appetites, and her vices.” Germany’s actions were
merely “barbarism reinforced by civilization.”45 The image of the
barbarous German enemy was not merely used to legitimize the
war cause. It also offered an opportunity to be directed towards
particular ends, such as war loans or military recruitment, and to
solicit the support of foreign neutrals.46
As the ideological battles were being fought with words
and documents, the realities of war were being experienced by
ordinary soldiers and civilians in the front-lines and in the
occupied territories. Few had to be read rhetoric about the brutality
of war in 1914. However, many used the nationalist discourse to
make sense of what was happening around them. As the Germans
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approached the city of Lille, Madame Delahaye-Théry, witnessed
the retreat of the French army, and wrote that “The Germans are
coming. It’s the end. The end for us.”47 It must be remembered that
although most of the stories of German barbarization were
exaggerated, horrible events did take place. As Modris Eksteins
put it:
If babies were not systematically snatched from
mothers’ arms and smashed against brick walls, if
nuns were not deliberately sought out for sodomy,
rape, and slaughter, if old people were not made to
crawl on all fours before being riddled with bullets,
considerable numbers of hostages were shot,
including women and children and octogenarians.48
It must also be remembered that the “atrocities” committed by the
Germans, while both real and definite, the representations used by
the French and Allies to designate the German enemy were also a
manner, and John Horne and Allan Kramer point out: “To find a
language for the realities of the German invasion.”49 However,
taken further, it could also, and should be said that it was the
attempt at elucidation of the realities of warfare in the age of
national communities and total war. The Germans were certainly
not alone in perpetrating brutal acts in 1914, and the equivocal use
of imagery, such as myths of the franc-tireur and the French with
the severed hands, reduced a complex and emotionally charged
situation to an emblematic person or action.50 Naturally, women
and children were for the French the most readily accessible link to
the imagery of a peaceful France forced into war by the German
aggressor. The image of raped women and severed hands became
the signifier to the cause of the national community. The myths
provided accessible justifications for the continuation of the war,
and outlined a purpose for the unity now obtained by the state. In
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this way, the national community, the state, and the war were
forged into one mentality, one experience, and one representation
that made the conflict seem as a fight to death, initiating a fatalism
and grim determination that only helped to totalize the war further.
Rudolf Binding, a German soldier serving on the Western
Front during 1918, wrote in his diary on August 12, expressing that
what he was experiencing during the war was something that was a
part of “uncontrollable movements and forces”:
In the end, even if an individual nation does not get
its deserts, humanity will. This generation has no
future, and deserves none. Anyone who belongs to
it lives no more. It is almost a consolation to realize
this. All that an individual can do to get out of the
wrack is to find some way of hewing out blocks of
stone wherewith to found a new structure which to
this generation will be nothing, and leave it as a
legacy to others.51
Binding’s prophetic words would indeed become realized: the
legacy of the First World War would surely be remembered in
stone, but the largest exposition of the legacy of the “lost
generation” would be expressed through history itself. The
mistakes made prior to and during 1914 would be repeated again
and again to this very day. The language of the national
community, although apparently held to be singular to the specific
community, is in reality a universal logic aimed at totalizing. This
is how we must look at the First World War when attempting to
understand how and why this war, and the rest of the twentieth
century became the horrible blood-bath that it was.
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